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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DIXIE S. COX,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.

)
,
)

Case No.
13242

MERVYN K. COX,
Defendant and Cross Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF
DEFENDANT-CROSS APPELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a divorce action wherein Plaintiff-Appellant
hereinafter referred to as Plaintiff, alleged mental cruelty
and asked for custody of the four minor children, a reasonable division of the property, child support, alimony
and attorney fees. Defendant and Cross Appellant, hereinafter referred to as Defendant, filed a counterclaim for
divorce on the grounds of cruelty and asked for custody of
the children, that a trust be provided for the children in
lieu of some other provision of support and that Plaintiff
be awarded no alimony.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The lower court granted the divorce to the Defendant
Mervyn K. Cox, Cross Appellant. The court initially
awarded custody of the four minor children to the Defend1
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ant but thereafter modified its decision and granted
custody to Plaintiff Dixie S. Cox who was the original
Appellant in this action.
After changing its decision to grant custody of the
children to Plaintiff, the court also ordered Defendant to
pay to the Plaintiff the sum of FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS ($500.00) per month as child support. It granted
to Plaintiff a total cash payment in the nature of alimony
and property settlement in the amount of $65,000.00, to
be reduced by $5,000.00 if paid within six months, which
was done.
RELIEF SOUGHT O N APPEAL
Defendant and Cross Appellant seeks a reversal of
the lower court's modified decision regarding child custody. Plaintiff and Appellant seeks a modification of the
property division, child support payments and alimony.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following facts in addition to those already
contained in Defendant's first brief on file herein and in
addition to Plaintiff's Statement of Facts relative to the
property division appear pertinent to the matter before
theCourt... :
:: :-:
On February 9, 1973, after having reviewed the evidence and memoranda filed by respective counsel, the
lower court awarded a cash amount of $65,000.00 to the
Plaintiff to be reduced to $60,000.00 if paid within six
months. The court further ordered Defendant to p^y

z
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Plaintiff $1,000.00 per month beginning from the date
of the order to assist her in moving from the state and
establishing her home. (R. 114-115)
Pursuant to the order of the court, Defendant subsequently paid during the six-month period which followed
the court's ruling, the amount of $1,000.00 per month.
Thereafter, in final compliance with the court order,
Defendant paid the remaining $54,000.00 as a cash settlement to Plaintiff which, together with the $6,000.00 already paid, satisfied the judgment and resulted in a reduction of the property settlement award from $65,000.00 to
$60,000.00. Defendant delivered his personal check in
the amount of $54,000.00 to Plaintiff on August 8, 1973,
several days prior to the expiration of the six-month period, and Plaintiff accepted Defendant's check at that
time.
When, on February 18, 1974, the court made an
order to have the $54,000.00 check placed in escrow, the
check had already been delivered to Plaintiff seven months
previous. Plaintiff thereafter cashed the check in spite
of the court order and in full satisfaction of the judgment.
After having considered the evidence and proposed
findings pertaining to property division submitted by
respective counsel, the court in its memorandum decision
dated December 14, 1973, further amplified and expounded on its ruling of February 9,1973, for the express purpose
and "to the end that any abuse of discretion be avoided or
that any mistake or error with respect to the lump sum
alimony award and property settlement" which had been

3
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previously "made by the court might be corrected, modified or amended'' and for the purpose of indicating to the
parties the basis upon which the award and division was
made. (R. 201) The court further found the net assets
belonging to the parties and subject to division and distribution to be the sum of $209,743.00 which the court
rounded to $210,000.00.
In arriving at its total award of $69,500.00 (Mem.
Dec. R. 203), the court utilized the recapitulation of assets
submitted by Plaintiff and Defendant. Plaintiff's valuation of the properties totaled $290,120.00 (R. 266), while
Defendant's recapitulation and valuation totaled $164,787.00, after deducting general debts and obligations owing
by the Defendant in addition to those owing on the properties. Plaintiff's brief only makes reference to Plaintiff's
recapitulation but fails to recognize the testimony and
evidence adduced by Defendant. In addition the cross examination of Plaintiff's appraisal witness disclosed that his
valuations of the properties under consideration were inflated and in some instances without adequate foundation
or basis. (Tr. 188, 191, 193, 194, 201) The court also
heard testimony regarding the remaining debts and obligations owing on the properties, which the court ordered
Defendant to assume, as well as testimony regarding Defendant's annual after-tax income and reduction in Defendant's practice due to the arrival of several new orthodontists in the area, (R. 417-418, R. 353-359, Exs. D-3,
D-4, D-5) The court had before it a statement of Defendant's debts and commitments totaling $20,100.00 in addition to those debts and obligations relating to property.
(R.261)

4
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

With regard to valuation of the properties, the court
also had the benefit of the 1973 Utah State Tax Commission valuation of which the court took judicial notice during its hearing on November 16, 1973. (R. 200, 241) The
State Tax Commission valued the parties' interest in the
properties as follows: The Bentley and Sullivan farm,
$36,210.00; Syphus farm, $18,469.00; home, $63,297.00;
Kolob property, $1,507.00; Pine Valley lot, $2,830.00;
Kemp Korner property, $79,843.00; carwash, $7,328.00.
(Based on a factor of 5 times the assessed valuation.)
At the conclusion of its memorandum decision, the
court referred to the figures it had used in arriving at its
award: (R. 204)
"They [the figures used} were and are an assistance to the trial court in testing the award in fact
made by the court and which decision the court is
not persuaded or constrained to alter, amend or
change in any respect. This includes the motion
by the Plaintiff to award her an in-kind distribution consistent with the net value held by the
parties in the Bentley and Sullivan farm. Under the
facts of this case, the court is persuaded that the
interests of the paries, including their present and
future equanimity, dictates an immediate, clean
and total division of interests and equities and a
cauterization thereof by legal fiat."
In addition to the foregoing facts regarding property
division and alimony Defendant further supplements his
statement with the following facts pertaining to custody.
Notwithstanding Plaintiff's representation in her
brief to the contrary, the record contains numerous references which would indicate immoral conduct on her part
in the presence of the children. Defendant refers the
5
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Court to pages 6, 7 and 8 of his first brief wherein this conduct is described. (Tr. 93, 94, 98-99, 101, 204, 291-296,
315) Plaintiff admitted that the man with whom she
associated was a married man at the time of their intimacies. (Tr. I l l ) This is the same man with whom Plaintiff kept company in the presence of her children on numerous occasions.
The immoral conduct of Plaintiff and considerable
time spent away from the home and children resulted in
neglect of the children. (Tr. 65, 101, 110, 129, 282, 284,
301, 313, 322, 336, 345, 346, 348, 393, 423)
Plaintiff's ten-day absence from the children in June
of 1972 was not by mutual agreement with Defendant.
(Tr. 436) Defendant, to the contrary, tried to persuade
Plaintiff to stay home with the children. Defendant was
unaware that Plaintiff would be gone for a ten-day period. (Tr. 436)
Plaintiff's statement of facts makes reference to testimony of Plaintiff's 15-year-old sister who claimed some
impropriety on the part of Defendant toward her; however, Defendant denied having had any such contact with
her. (Tr. 461) The only time Defendant ever danced with
Plaintiff's sister was when Plaintiff was teaching dance to
a man in the kitchen of the Cox home and her sister came
into the living room and asked Defendant to dance with
her. Nothing improper took place. (Tr. 461) On another
occasion Plaintiff's sister kissed Defendant on the cheek
at the dinner table in front of the family and thanked him
for straightening her teeth. (Tr. 461)

6
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Plaintiff also makes reference to a former employee
of Defendant and suggests that there may have been an
improper relationship between Defendant and that employee; however, Plaintiff's own citations to the record
clearly indicate that there is no substance to that suggestion. (Tr. 438, 439, 451)
In its oral ruling on February 9, 1973, the court
found as follows:
"Now, the court finds that in the course of the
testimony Mrs. Cox, Dixie S. Cox, testified that as
soon as this divorce was completed it was her intention and desire to leave Washington County
and to move to Boise, Idaho, for the purpose, as
soon as legally possible, of marrying a man by the
name of Hamilton. The court finds on the proof,
without any specific finding of any gross impropriety, although in the judgment of this court
the evidence may support and does support poor
judgment in having Mr. Hamilton associated as
close as he was, to say the least, but the court's
concern about taking those children from Washington County in the immediate future and taking
them to Boise, Idaho, and in a short period of time
introduce them into a new home, Mrs. Cox having
testified that she intended to marry this Mr. Hamilton; and the court having further some concern as
to the propriety and judgment of some of the actions that the court heard testimony on concerning
Mr. Hamilton and the position that he placed the
Plaintiff in, the court is going to order that until
the month of August, 1973, that the Defendant and
Counter-Claimant in this case have the care, custody
and control of the minor children; the court finding that to be in the best interest of those children
until it makes a further determination as to the
stability in your life and as to the fact situations
with respect to your plans, Mrs. Cox."

7
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The matter of custody was not considered again until
October 5, 1973, at which time the court awarded custody
of the four minor children to the Plaintiff without hearing
any testimony or making any statement or finding regarding any change of circumstances on which to predicate
awarding custody to the Plaintiff, particularly since the
court had previously found that it was in the best interests
of the children to award custody to their father. The court
had also found that Plaintiff had manifested poor judgment and impropriety and lack of stability in her life.
Counsel for Defendant argued at that time before the
court that there had been no change whatever in the nature
or character of the family situation from that depicted to
the court at the time it rendered is prior decision and that
change of custody would be totally unwarranted and
manifestly against the vital interests of the four small
children. (Tr. 21)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFFS APPEAL FROM THE PROPERTY SETTLEMENT PROVISIONS OF THE
DIVORCE J U D G M E N T IS PRECLUDED BECAUSE T H A T JUDGMENT HAS BEEN SATISFIED I N FULL A N D PLAINTIFF HAS ACCEPTED THE BENEFITS THEREUNDER.
The overwhelming weight of authority is to the
effect that a party having recognized the validity of a
judgment and decree of divorce rendered by the court in
a divorce action by accepting the favorable provisions
thereof, financial and/or marital, accruing to him thereunder, in the absence of fraud, is estopped from question,8
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ing the validity of such judgment or decree from and after
the acceptance of such benefit or benefits. Here follows
a list of some of the relatively recent decisions representing
a sampling from various jurisdictions where the general
rule is followed: Sidebottom v. Sidebottom, 233 N.E.2d
667 (1968); Bulpitt v. Bulpitt, 107 Cal.App.2d 550, 237
P.2d 539 (1951); Peters v. Peters, 175 Kan. 422, 263 P.2d
1019 (1953); Spratt v. Spratt, 140 Minn. 510, 166 N.W.
769, appeal dismissed 140 Minn. 512, 167 N.W. 735
(1918); Gerbig v. Gerbig, 60 Nev. 292, 108 P.2d 317
(1940); Jackson v. Jackson, 248 Iowa 1365, 85 N.W.2d
590 (1957); Mason v. Forrest, 332 S.W.2d 634 (1959);
Larabee v. Larabee, 128 Neb. 560, 259 N.W. 520 (1935);
Swallers v. Swallers, 89 Cal.App.2d 458, 201 P.2d 23
(1948); Moffett v. Moffett, 142 Kan. 9, 45 P.2d 579
(1935); Isenhart v. henhart, 207 Or. 365, 296 P.2d 927
(1956); Clark v. Clark, 362 S.W.2d 655 (1962); Murray v.
Murray, 38 Wash.2d 269, 229 P.2d 309 (1951); Potter v.
Potter, 46 Wash.2d 526, 282 P.2d 1052 (1955).
This Court has followed the general rule that where
a judgment is voluntarily paid and accepted, the right
to appeal is waived. In the case of Jensen v. Eddy, 30 Utah
2d 154, 514 P.2d 1142 (1973), the court held as follows:
"We are in agreement with the general rule that if
a judgment is voluntarily paid, which is accepted,
and a judgment satisfied, the controversy has become moot and the right to appeal is waived. This
is baesd upon the reasoning that when a controversy has come to rest, the litigation should cease."
at 156
While in the Jensen case the court recognized an exception to the general rule that acceptance of an amount
9
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pertaining to a separate and distinct claim does not waive
right to appeal, this case clearly does not come within that
exception.
?

In the present case the judgment and cause of action
regarding division of property are one and the same. The
lower court took into account all of the property of the
parties and considered several factors which it enumerated
in determining what it thought was an equitable division
of the property.
Another exception to the general rule not applicable
to the present case, was noted by the court in the case of
Sierra Nevada Mill Company v. Keith O'Brien Company,
48 Utah 12, 156 Pac. 943 (1916). This is not a situation
where the amount found in favor of the plaintiff was due
her in any event. There was and is a controversy over what
amount, if any, she should be awarded.
At no time has Defendant in this case admitted that
the amount awarded Plaintiff was due her in any event.
There is no stipulation or agreement between the parties
which agrees on the amount finally awarded or which
recogni2es said amount as due, except as the court ordered.
It is clear from the record that Defendant controverted
Plaintiff's valuation of property in several significant respects. In fact, there is approximately $127,314.00 difference between Plaintiff's and Defendant's valuation of the
property to be divided. If the court had followed Defendant's appraisal, its determination of total valuation would
have been $45,213.00 less than it actually found, and
would have correspondingly reduced the amount awarded
to Plaintiff.
10
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That such a controversy over valuation and equitable
division of the property existed in the present case is evident in the record. The question now before this Court
regarding property division is not merely whether Plaintiff is entitled to a greater or additional sum than awarded
her by the lower court but also includes the question
whether equity and fairness demand that Plaintiff's award
be reduced and whether the lower court abused its discretion in awarding such an amount.
Further, it is not necessary for Defendant to crossappeal from the judgment to invoke the rule. The court in
the Sierra case faced this argument squarely and held as
follows:
"But it is said the defendant has prosecuted no
cross appeal. That is not essential to the making of
cross-assignments in defense and in support of, and
merely to hold, the judgment appealed from. W h a t
is attacked by the party appealing may, as to him,
be defended and held by cross-assignments without cross-appeal." at 20-21
Of particular interest and application to the present case
is the court's conclusion in the Sierra Nevada case:
We think the case within the general rule that a
litigant is not permitted to accept the fruits of a
judgment and still prosecute an appeal from it.
Here the plaintiff voluntarily took advantage not
only of a part of a judgment in its favor, but of the
whole of it, and accepted payment in full thereof
and satisfied and discharged the whole of the
judgment. All of the issues and matters and things
presented, both by the complaint and counterclaim
were merged in, and were determined by the judgment. There is no doubt of that. And when the
11
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

plaintiff voluntarily accepted full payment of the
judgment, not of a part, but of the whole of it,
and satisfied and discharged it, not in part, but
the whole thereof, it likewise satisfied and discharged everything that was merged in, and that
was determined and adjudicated by the judgment.
The views herein expressed and the conclusions
reached are supported by the numerous cases noted
and cited in McKain v. Mullen, 65 W.Va. 558, 64
S.E. 829, 29 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1." at 21-22 (Emphasis
added)
The fact that Defendant complied with the lower
court's order and judgment with respect to the division
of property does not admit that the Plaintiff is so absolutely and unquestionably entitled to the benefits and
advanages awarded by the judgment that her right to
accept them and keep them cannot possibly be affected by
the appeal. Quite to the contrary, Defendant argued in
the court below and continues to assert before this Court
that he Plaintiff should not have been awarded the amount
granted to her by the lower court. Defendant was under
an obligation to pay the judgment within six months or be
saddled with an additional $5,000 obligation.
POINT II
EVEN IF THE COURT ALLOWS PLAINTIFF'S
APPEAL, MODIFICATION OF THE PROPERTY A N D ALIMONY AWARD, IF ANY,
SHOULD RESULT I N A REDUCED A W A R D
W H I C H W O U L D BE I N HARMONY W I T H
THE EQUITIES OF THIS PARTICULAR CASE.
This Court in the case of Sorensen v. Sorensen, 14
Utah 2d 24, 376 P.2d 547 (1963), held with regard to its
duty to sustain the trial court's division of property.

12
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"Unless there is manifest injustice and inequity or
a clear abuse of discretion, this court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court." at
26
Although the lump sum award as ordered by the
court was paid by Defendant in compliance with the court
order and voluntarily accepted by Plaintiff as heretofore
discussed, Defendant has always taken the position that
the award pertaining to property division was excessive
and inequitable in light of the attendant circumstances and
facts so that if it is to be modified, such modification
should result in a reduced award.
In suggesting that the award be increased above onethird of the assets, which plaintiff recognizes as being
the general rule in divorce matters, Plaintiff relies on the
cases of Woolley v. Woolley, Lundgreen v. Lundgreen, Tremayne v. Tremayne and Pinion v. Pinion. For example,
in the case of Woolley v. Woolley, 113 Utah 391, 195
P.2d 743 (1949), the court granted the divorce to the
husband and awarded property along the following guidelines:
"While a wife is ordinarily granted a divorce for
mental cruelty on less provocation than a husband, there may be facts and circumstances appearing to the trial court to present a stronger case for
the husband." at 393.
;7; *

*

*

"In determining generally what a wife is entitled
to when a divorce decree has been granted to the
, husband, we have considered one-third as being a
fair proportion. This is a relative amount which
must, of necessity, vary with the facts of the particular case." at 395 (Emphasis added)
13
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In the case of Dahlberg v. Dahlberg, 77 Utah 157,
292 Pac. 214 (1930), the court observed the following:
"Of course, the rights and equities of both parties
are to be considered, but whatever doubt there may
be concerning the matter, it ought to be resolved
against the guilty party whose fault and wrongs
and breaches of the marital relation destroyed the
home and forced or brought about the separation."
at 163 (Emphasis added)
In the Lundgreen case there was no discussion of a onethird division. That case by no means supports Plaintiff's argument. The court merely held that in addition to
the furniture plaintiff had prior to the marriage and her
personal articles acquired since the marriage, she should
be awarded one-half of the enhanced value of the house
after deducting the original purchase price. The record
was silent as to the present market value of the house, but
it was purchased in 1943 for $395.00. The case was decided only three years later in 1947. There is considerable
question as to how much the property would have increased in value over that short period of time and consequently how much would be due the wife as her one-half
of the enhanced value after deducting the original purchase value. In the Lundgreen case divorce was granted to
the husband*
In the cases of Tremayne v. Tremayne, 116 Utah 483,
211 P.2d 452 (1949), and Pinion v. Pinion, 92 Utah 255,
67 P.2d 265 (1937), divorce was awarded to the wife.
There were special circumstances not present in the instant
case which were taken into consideration by the court as
discussed in Plaintiff's brief.
14
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By arguing that the purpose of the court in dividing
property is to permit the parties to reconstruct their lives,
Plaintiff seems to imply that it is the Court's duty in this
case to divide the property so that Plainiff, regardless of
her conduct, may reconstruct her life with her new husband
in such a way as to maintain indefinitely the same standard of living she enjoyed with the husband she wronged.
This argument is certainly contrary to the court's pronouncements in the Woolley case and Dahlberg case,
supra.
Plaintiff cites the case of Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Utah
2d 79, 296 P.2d 977 (1956). In that case, however, the
court held that:
"The court's responsibility is to endeavor to provide a just and equitable adjustment of their economic resources so that the parties can reconstruct
their lives on a happy and useful basis. In doing so
it is necessary for the court to consider, in addition
to the relative guilt or innocence of the parties, an
appraisal of all of the attendant factors and circumstances. . . ." at 83 (Emphasis added)
In the Wilson case the court also took into consideration
the "dimmed prospects of a favorable marriage and life
companionship" for the wife. Obviously, that is not a
consideration before the Court in this Case. Again, in the
Wilson case divorce was granted to the wife and the lower
court based its determination in part on the fact that the
husband had fallen in love with another woman.
It is easy to see why the court chose to modify the
property award in the case of Bullen v. Bullen, 71 Utah
63, 262 Pac. 292 (1928), cited by Plaintiff. There the prop15
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erty awarded the wife had a value of $600.00 as compared to the husband's $20,000.00. In other words, the
wife received 1/3 3rd of the total property of the parties.
Plaintiff also relies on the case of Ring v. Ring, 29
Utah 2d 436, 511 P.2d 155 (1973), in support of her argument. In that case the parties, both physicians, had entered
into a stipulation where it was obvious to the court that
they had agreed that $800.00 was reasonable and necessary to support the family unit and that the apportionment between alimony and child support had been motivated by tax considerations. The court held that it was
improper for the lower court to reduce the alimony since
the parties clearly intended some of the alimony to be used
for child support. In that case the husband was paying
$66.66 monthly per child as child support compared to
$125.00 monthly per child in the present case. Here the
child support award is such that it may well be used by
the Plaintiff and her new husband to support the entire
family unit.
In the case of Weaver v. Weaver, 21 Utah 2d 166, 442
P.2d 928 (1968), cited by Plaintiff, special distinguishing
factors which may have justified an equal division of
property included the following: (1) the parties had been
married 30 years as compared to 11 in the present case;
(2) the divorce was awarded to the wife; (3) the wife was
totally disabled at the time of the divorce; (4) the wife
was not awarded any alimony and she was directed to pay
her own attorneys fee and cost.
Plaintiff incorrectly states that the facts in the present case indicate that the parties have accumulated $292,16
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101.00 since their marriage. The court found that the total
value was $210,000.00, which is more than Defendant's
evidence showed it to be.
Defendant's appraisal of net worth, including the
stipulation as to value at trial which form part of the record (R. 259-261) (Tr. 147, 148, 209, 212, 403, 405, 406,
409, 413, 412, 414, 415) totals $164,787.00 after deducting general debts and obligations of $20,100.00 owing by
Defendant other than balance owing on properties.
There is a difference of $127,314.00 between Plaintiff's
and Defendant's valuations after deducting general debts
and obligations owing by Defendant other than the balances owing on properties.
The principal differences in property valuations between Plaintiff and Defendant concern the Bentley and
Sullivan farm, the Syphus farm and the home. Respective
valuations of the parties' interest in these properties are as
follows: (R. 259-261; Plaintiff's Brief 7-8)

Property
Bentley and Sullivan farm
Syphus farm
Home

Defendant's
Valuation

Plaintiff's
Valuation

$ 52,000.00
40,000.00
65,100.00
$157,100.00

$104,000.00
60,500.00
74,500.00
$239,000.00

-37,166.00

-38,000.00

-34,717.00

-34,717.00

$ 85,217.00

$166,283.00

Less Defendant's share of
indebtedness in Bentley and
Sullivan farm
Less Defendant's share of
indebtedness in Syphus farm
Total
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In the November 16, 1973, hearing (R. 200,241)
which was apparently unreported [minute entry reflects
fact that parties were heard at length regarding property
settlement, R. 241], the court took judicial notice of the
recent State Tax Commission adjusted appraisal value
which was completed in 1973 on these same properties
showing total values of properties for agricultural use
and market value. The court noted that the Tax Commission appraisal values are a matter of public record. They
reflect the following: [5 times assessed valuation}
State Tax Commission
Property
1973 Valuation
Bentley and Sullivan farm
Syphusfarm
Home
Total valuation

$ 36,210.00
18,468.00
63,297.00
$117,975.00

Less Defendant's share of
indebtedness according to
Defendant
Net valuation

-71,883.00

$ 46,092.00

With respect to these three properties, Defendant's
valuation is actually $39,125.00 over that of the 1973
Tax Commission valuation, while Plaintiff's valuation is
$121,025.00 over that of the Tax Commission.
W e further call attention to the following admission made by Plaintiff's witness as to his appraisals and
valuations:
(1) That he did not have any comparable sales upon
which to base his opinion of value with regard to the Bentley and Sullivan farm insofar as other farmlands in the
immediate area were concerned. (Tr. 188)
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(2) That it was possible that one of his comparables was purchased by Bloomington at a premium price
in order for Bloomington to acquire the property it
needed. (Tr. 191)
(3) That one of his comparables was property sold
near the campus of Dixie College which is zoned for
multiple housing. (Tr. 194)
(4) That he had appreciated the Syphus property
by $61,000.00 even though it had been acquired less than
a year prior to the divorce proceedings (Tr. 193)
(5) That the reason he appreciated the Syphus farm
to that degree was that it was within the city limits; however, he admitted that at the time the Coxes purchased
the property it is possible that it was already within the
city limit. (Tr. 196)
(6) That he was unable to find a home of the size
and characteristics of the Cox home as a comparable.
(Tr.201)
(7) That if the properties were to be sold, after
title insurance and real estate commissions were deducted, the profit would be substantially reduced. (Tr. 197,
205,219)
Another item concerns the Convertible Bond. In the
Record at page 260 the Bond is valued at $1,000.00. Apparently there is an error in the transcript of Defendant's
testimony which mistakenly recorded the amount of
$8,000.00 rather than $1,000.00. (Tr. 4l4)
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All matters were ruled upon and concluded at the
October 5, 1973, hearing except the issue with respect to
the court's lump sum alimony award to the Plaintiff and
property distribution between the parties. The court ruled
with regard to alimony and property division on November 16, 1973, and enumerated the following criteria as
the basis of its decision: (Mem. Dec. R. 200-201)
*'There values, in the judgment of the court, must
be tested in the light of the respective positions of
the parties and determine therefrom whether or not
they meet the test of fairness and equal treatment
under the standards set down by the cases in the
State of Utah (cases cited} and any particular facts
and circumstances in this case. T o that end, the
court considered the additional facts and circumstances in this particular lawsuit:
" 1 . Consideration of the assets or equity in real
property and improvements with large encumbrances remaining to be paid.
"2. The Plaintiff testified and reiterated that she
intended to move away from Washington County,
Utah, the location of the property and improvements, and to the State of Idaho and to enter into
a new marriage contract as soon as legally possible.
" 3 . The court considered a cash value of Plaintiff's share in the net worth of the parties as opposed to a division in kind.
"4. The court considered the burden upon
Defendant and his earning ability in paying to
Plaintiff a present day cash award, supporting
children belonging to the parties, and servicing
debts on the property.

the
the
the
the

{The court hereafter tested the award as made
against the compilation of net assets as determined
by the Plaintiff and Defendant respectively and
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thereby concluded that the award made by the court
was comparable.}" (Mem. Dec. R. 203) (Emphasis
added)
The Defendant testified at trial that the BentleySullivan farm contained about 43 acres when purchased
and that approximately three acres were washed down the
river by flood. He also testified that only about 20 to 21
acres of the farm could be irregated and that almost all of
the property was wasteland. (Tr. 407)
The Court also considered the fact that Defendant's
practice has been substantially curtailed with the recent
location of several new orthodontists in the area. (R. 417418) When the parties first moved to St. George, there
were no other orthodontists practicing between Provo
and Las Vegas. (R. 417)
Defendant's annual after-tax income during the three
years prior to the divorce was $15,100.00. (Exhibits D-3,
D-4, D-5; R. 353-359) Out of that income he is now required to make payments toward considerable debts and
obligations, as well as $500.00 a month payments for
child support.
It is Defendant's position that on the basis of the
value of the property as submitted by Defendant and the
1973 Utah State Tax Commission valuation, the lower
court should have awarded Plaintiff less property settleand/or less support money for the children. Moreover, in
other jurisdictions, courts have awarded the innocent
spouse more than the normal share in cases of extreme
mental cruelty or adultery. Dallman v. Dallman, 164
Cal.2d 815, 331 P.2d 245 (1958).
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In view of the conduct of the Plaintiff in this case,
it seems grossly unfair for the court to award her in excess of one-third of the property and to leave the innocent spouse under an extreme financial burden. By so
doing, the court appears to reward and condone such misconduct.
•••:*••••..-;.- u\/:.-X- ; W . ' 0 ;•*•::.••
In making its determination of property value and
subsequent award, the court below should have given
greater weight and consideration to the following:
(1) The admissions of Plaintiff's witness which
were evidence of his inflated appraisals.
(2) The State Tax Commission appraisal of which
the court took judicial notice and which was considerably
less than appraisals of both parties.
(3) The wrongs and breaches of the marital relation
committed by Plaintiff which destroyed the home and
forced or brought about the separation.
(4) The hardship to Defendant in paying a lump
sum payment in addition to being left with responsibility
of servicing the debts on the properties and child support.

POINT III
IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR
THE TRIAL COURT TO REVERSE ITS ORIGINAL CUSTODY ORDER WITHOUT A SPECIFIC FINDING THAT THE REVERSAL WAS
JUSTIFIED BY A CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES.
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In addition to the matters discussed by Defendants
in his initial brief, we submit there was no basis for the
court reversing its initial order as to custody of the minor
children.
The court made specific findings in its ruling on
February 9, 1973, at which time it awarded the divorce to
Defendant, as well as custody of the four minor children.
(R. 113-14) The subsequent change of custody without
a showing of change of circumstances was clearly an abuse
of discretion. The court specifically found on the proof
supported by the evidence presented that the Plaintiff had
exercised poor judgment in having Mr. Hamilton associated as close as he was. The court further expressed concern as to the propriety and judgment of some of the actions
that the court heard testimony on concerning Mr. Hamilton and the position he had placed the Plaintiff in. The
court also expressed concern about the fact that the Plaintiff planned to take the children from Washington County
in the immediate future to Boise, Idaho, and to introduce them into a new home and that she planned to marry
this Mr. Hamilton.
After finding it in the best interest of the children to
award custody to their father upon the above stated considerations, it was encumbent upon the court to require
a showing of change of circumstances which would justify
a change of custody before that change was made.
This Court held in the case of Crofts v. Crofts, 21
Utah 2d 332, 445 P.2d 701 (1968), as follows:
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"{T}he finality of a judgment must be respected
in order to insure the rights of parties. Section
30-3-5, U.C.A., 1953, provides:
« <# # * Such subsequent changes or new
orders may be made by the court with respect
to the disposal of the children or the distribution
of property as shall be reasonable and proper.'
"This, however, requires some good cause based
upon a change of circumstances for modifying the
decree and cannot be done by interpreting the
language thereof." at 334-335.
Counsel for Plaintiff specifically stated to the court
at the October hearing when order as to custdy was reversed that Plaintiff's testimony would show that her
circumstances had not changed with regard to her intention to move. (Tr. 18) N o further representation as to
change of circumstances was made by Plaintiff's counsel
and no showing of change of circumstances was required
by the court. Counsel for Defendant, on the other hand,
took the following position:
"Now, it is our position, your Honor, that there is
not one scintilla of evidence in the record or before this court to show any change of circumstance,
which I am sure was anticipated and toward which
the court directed the character of its judgment
back in February of this year. . . . I think the
record is clear and replete with evidence which
shows that the total best interest of those children is to remain with their father and if at some
time in the future the mother establishes a home
. some place where she can show at that time a home
life and home situation which is condusive to the
best interest of the children, she, as in all cases of
this kind, has the right to petition the court for a
modification of he decree.
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SUMMARY
We respectfully submit that if the judgment of the
lower court regarding property division, alimony and
child support is modified, such modification should result
in a reduced award.
The children should be returned to the custody of
their father consistent with the original order of the trial
court.
Respectfully submitted,
Arthur H. Nielsen
Randall L. Romrell
NIELSEN, CONDER, HENRIOD
AND GOTTFREDSON
410 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
V. Pershing Nelson
ALDRICH AND NELSON
Fidelity Building
Provo, Utah 84601
Attorneys for Defendant-Cross
Appellant
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